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A Sorry State of Affairs: Chinese Arrivants, Indigenous Hosts, and Settler Colonial 
Apologies 
 
Angie Wong, Lakehead University 
Abstract: We make and give gestures of apology every day, Canadians doubly so. Yet, grand acts 
of apology for more serious and sustained matters, such as historical and contemporary injustice 
against those with the least amount of social power, require far more ethical consideration and 
transformation than simply saying, “I am sorry.” Since the early 2000s, several political parties 
of the Canadian government have taken up the trend of making a spectacle out of national 
apologies to historically oppressed groups. Engaging with the concept of the settler colonial triad 
to theorize the histories of early Chinese arrivants’ experience, this work departs from the 2006 
House of Commons apology made to Chinese Canadians on behalf of former PM Stephen 
Harper and explores the paradoxical operations behind state-sanctioned apologies, including the 
use of benevolence and hospitality as crisis management tactics resultant of Canada’s settler 
colonial configuration. Within this contradictory relation, those who identify as Chinese 
Canadian may find themselves questioning their belonging, given the historically- fraught social 
strategies used for the making of Canadian subjecthood. State-sanctioned apologies function to 
consolidate settler colonial reality and constitute a return to normalcy, which is why critical race 
scholars and scholars of settler colonial studies must look beyond unilateral relationships with 
the state. 
 
Angie Wong is a critical race scholar and second-generation Chinese born in Canada. Wong is 
currently a professor of Women’s Studies at Lakehead University in Thunder Bay, Ontario. 
Reliant upon critical race theory, philosophy, settler colonial studies, and transnational 
feminisms, Wong continues to research the experiences of Asian women and histories of Chinese 
racialization in Canada in a forthcoming book project on the Chinatown community of Calgary, 
Alberta. Wong obtained a BCC from the University of Calgary (2012). Her MA (2014) and PhD 
(2018) in Humanities are from York University where she conducted the first extensive 
philosophical and critical race analysis of the small and powerful grassroots magazine 
publication, The Asianadian, under the supervision of Chinese Canadian and postcolonial 
scholar, Lily M. Cho. Wong’s approach to pedagogy and research is interdisciplinary, political, 
and cross-cultural. 
 
Since the early 2000s, the government of Canada has fallen into a trend of performing 
national apologies to historically oppressed and racialized groups and peoples, including 
Indigenous peoples, the Chinese, and South Asians.i In the chic liberal push for political 
correctness and in the challenges that social justice cultural workers continue to pose to the 
settler colonial government regarding redress, reparations, and belonging, Canada’s national 
apologies are increasingly ambiguous and suspicious in their purpose. Given the underlying 
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nature of performativity associated with the gesture of national apologies, alongside the 
replication of similar phraseology and wording present in each 21st century national apology, this 
work assesses the aporetic function of state-sponsored apologies through Indigenous 
knowledges, Chinese Canadian social and political history, and political philosophy. 
Specifically, I question the triangular social and philosophical relationships among Chinese 
arrivants, Indigenous hosts, and white settlers to robustly interrogate the inauthenticity of settler 
colonial apologies. In this consideration of the aporetic function of national apologies, I will 
examine the historical and political trajectory that prompted the apology to Chinese Canadians in 
2006 by former Prime Minister Stephen Harper and consider some philosophical notions of 
forgiveness, hosting, and how to be a good guest. I come to this work as a second-generation 
Asian person born in Canada, student of philosophy and Asian Canadian studies, and community 
activist. Temporally, I depart from the social and historical contexts of early Chinese arrivants on 
Turtle Island in order to understand the context of the Harper government’s apology from the 
House of Commons in 2006 for the Chinese head tax and subsequent Chinese Immigration Act 
(1923-1947). Tracing and traversing various sites of 20th century Chinese exploitation and 
exclusion in Canada is meaningful in order to comprehend how apology and benevolence are 
used as tactics of settler colonialism that unethically absolve the state of historical injustice. This 
is a timely intervention as Canada recently celebrated its 150th anniversary as a country; indeed, 
revisiting the apology to Chinese Canadians more than a decade after it was given is a vital 
challenge against the practicality and continued use of state-sanctioned apologies, since the 
fundamental ontological participation, simultaneous exclusion, and eventual assimilation of the 
Chinese into Canada secured an ambivalent and passive acceptance of their belonging in fraught 
social orders of belonging. 
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Theoretical Foundations 
 My basis for critiquing settler colonial apologies relies on inquiry into Chinese Canadian 
histories and their relationship to settler colonization. It is rooted in critical race theory and 
settler colonial social theory which seek to explain the relationship between primarily three 
groups of people: Indigenous peoples, white settlers, and racialized arrivants, who typically 
perform foundational work for nation-making to establish settler colonies and their economies. 
This relationship is known more broadly as “the settler colonial triad” and involves the intricate 
examination of the relationship among settler, native, and arrivant. Racialized arrivants who 
come to Indigenous lands do so through a spectrum of movements that have ranged from the 
violence of slavery to the voluntary movements of racialized professionals.ii The arrivant is a 
critical placeholder of the settler colonial triad who works to disclose processes of racialization 
(xenophobic immigration policies) from colonization (the continued theft of Indigenous land and 
resources) by mapping out a third space between the settler and the native. The arrivant is not 
only a racial designation in terms of being non-Indigenous and non-white. Arrivants are also 
analytically distinct in terms of their labouring capacities, desired and exploited by the state. 
According to Patrick Wolf--in Traces of History as well as the foundational article, “Settler 
Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” (2006)--settler colonial societies are founded on 
logics of elimination wherein Indigenous peoples are targeted for destruction or assimilation in 
settler colonial projects seeking access to land. In its abundance and perceived cheapness, the 
introduction of racialized labour became crucial for the development of settler colonial 
economies.  
Also prominent in the field of settler colonial studies is Lorenzo Veracini, whose 
schematic for understanding settler colonial societies in Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical 
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Overview (2010) informs the ways I approach the settler colonial triad, as well as the institutions 
and apparatuses that maintain whiteness through British-Canadian values in the form of federal 
policies, the national archive, and the official histories and metanarratives sponsored by the state. 
Veracini draws a distinction between colonial power formations, which typically operate through 
the appropriation of the labour power of Indigenous peoples, and settler colonial formations, 
which function by clearing out lands of their Indigenous habitants through genocidal projects of 
elimination and importing racialized borders to form foundational modes of labour. Of course, 
the most commonly cited example of the ways in which “settlers bring their work with them” (to 
borrow Wolfe’s formulation), is the use of Black slavery to provide the United States of America 
with a labour force that allowed it to enter markets of global capital and rise as a competitor and 
eventual leader of a neoliberal capitalist economy, forged in the violence of the Atlantic slave 
trade and westward expansion. Thus, particular formations of anti-Asian racism and Asian 
racialization, though not directly settler colonial in nature, are born out of settler colonial regimes 
of economic structuring and ideological construction. While both Indigenous people and 
arrivants are made subordinate or settler colonial nation-making projects, their experiences under 
settler colonialism differ vastly on the basis of being racialized differently. Settlers will allow 
agreeable or desirable arrivants to assimilate into the norms of the settler state, such as by way of 
extending apologies to an historically wronged group, but this is entirely for the benefit of the 
settler colony.  
 Situated as we are in a Canadian context, I approach histories of settler colonization, 
diaspora, and labour by and through the history of the completion of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway, which preceded the Chinese Immigration Act (also known as the Chinese Exclusion 
Act). It is the structural development of the railway that made evident the historical 
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consciousness that white Canada desired cheap Chinese labour and not Chinese subjects/citizens. 
For this reason, I echo Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s article, “Decolonization is not a 
Metaphor.” This article, itself written by an Indigenous and Asian scholar, names and thinks 
through the settler colonial triad. To anchor this context, I use the discourses on political-ethical 
responsibility by thinkers such as Derrida and Levinas and read them alongside Lee Maracle’s 
explanation of Indigenous host laws. These thinkers offer profound insights for generating 
meaningful comparative and cross-cultural analyses which help us to rethink the intricacies that 
exist between Indigenous and racialized peoples, beyond a liberal politics of settler recognition, 
on both a material and ethical level. 
The Apology 
 On June 22, 2006, then Prime Minister Stephen Harper made a statement of apology in 
the House of Commons to all Chinese Canadian affected by the 1885-1923 head tax and 1923 
amendment to the Chinese Immigration Act, which attempted to prohibit all people of Chinese 
ancestry from entering Canada. The amendment outlined new restrictions for entry and landing 
in Canada and were confined to the following classes: members of diplomatic corps or other 
government representatives, children born in Canada to parents of Chinese origin who have left 
Canada for educational or other purposes, merchants, and students coming to Canada to attend 
university or college. Beginning in the Spring of 1923, no other class of Chinese people was 
authorized to enter Canada. The Act was not repealed until 1947. Harper echoed the apologies of 
the New Democratic Party and the Liberal party by affirming on behalf of the government of 
Canada and all Canadians: “We fully accept the moral responsibility to acknowledge these 
shameful policies of our past” and “On behalf of all Canadians of the government of Canada, we 
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offer full apology to Chinese Canadians for the head tax and express our deepest sorrow for the 
subsequent exclusion of Chinese immigrants.” iii 
In addition to this national apology, a monetary settlement of $20,000 was given to each of the 
living head tax payers or their surviving spouse. By this time in 2006, there were less than ten 
Chinese Canadian elders alive who received settlement. This is a depressingly small sum of 
money when compared to the $13.8 million in head tax revenues collected alone between 1905 
and 1914, as well as the $3-5 million saved by the Canadians state for hiring cheap Chinese 
labour.iv Nevertheless, elders accepted the monetary reparation. With this performance, gestures, 
and financial exchange, Chinese Canadians were symbolically incorporated into the community 
of Canada.  
This national apology was in some sense generative of a new cultural dynamic of 
apologism in Canadian politics, as it appeared to ignite a trend of state-sponsored apologies 
extended to other marginalized and racialized people in Canada. That is, the issuing of apologies 
for historical injustice have become symbolically vital to settler colonial performances that 
welcome certain marginalized people into the body politic while simultaneously relegating the 
actions and policies of the state to a distant past, thereby reinforcing the notion that present 
injustices bear no relation to the injustices of the past or to the injustices that may come in the 
future. Compartmentalizing the past through a linear conception of temporality to signify 
distance from historical wrongdoing ensures an emphasis on the present, the now, the finality of 
acceptance into the totality of white Canadian society after a century of settlers and arrivants 
living in passive proximation to one another.v Though rhetorically and financially complex in 
their making, settler colonial apologies have far reaching implications that affect ancestral 
relations and white settler futurity. 
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 This is not the first time the Canadian government has had to scramble to secure white 
settler futurity. As early at 1988, Japanese Canadians were the first racialized group to 
successfully lobby the government for a formal apology; they succeeded in attaining redress 
from the Conservative party and then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney apologized on behalf of 
the government of Canada for the internment of Japanese people in Canada during WWII.vi This 
was a monumental victory for all Asians in Canada because it was the first time the Canadian 
government publicly claimed responsibility for systemic racism against Japanese people in 
Canada. Eighteen years later in 2006, an apology was made to Chinese Canadians for the head 
tax and the Chinese Exclusion Act. Following in 2008, Harper also apologized to Indigenous 
peoples for the residential school system.vii On May 18, 2016, current Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau apologized to the Sikh community for the 1914 incident of the Komagata Maru, in 
which 355 South Asian men were denied entry to Canada. In March 2017, Trudeau urged Pope 
Francis to apologize for the Catholic Church’s abuse of Indigenous people; Francis has refused 
to offer any apology. Most recently in March 2019, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau offered an 
apology to the Inuit community for the federal government’s mismanagement during the 
tuberculosis epidemic from the 1940s to the 1960s. In the theatre of Canadian settler colonial 
politics, these apologies appear to form a larger trend of settler conviviality that illustrates how 
the enactment of institutionalized hospitality and benevolence work together with the rhetoric of 
apology and forgiveness to preserve the tranquility of settler colonial hegemony and social 
identity. 
 
Uncontestable Presences Behind Apology 
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 The optics of the apology to Chinese Canadians were such that the state gave finality to 
much of the reconciliation process, even though redress and the request for an apology was 
decades in the making. As early as 1984, the federal government authorized the Chinese 
Canadian National Council (CCNC) to represent the victims of the Chinese Immigration Act; at 
that time, the CCNC compiled a list of 2,300 surviving Chinese who paid the $500 head tax. The 
CCNC vowed to take their case to international tribunals if “legal channels were exhausted and 
there appeared to be no political will to redress the head tax by the government in 2003.”viii An 
apology to Chinese Canadians thus became an act of political momentum, rather than one of 
governmental transformation. According to sociologist Peter Li, an official apology to the 
Chinese Canadian community was a campaign promise that Conservative member Stephen 
Harper was willing to fulfill in order to garner Chinese Canadian votes. Paul Martin of the 
Liberal Party, interestingly, initially refused to work into his campaign the promise of an 
apology, and although he later changed his mind, it is speculated that the head tax issue may 
have contributed to the loss of the Liberal Party in the election.ix The apology to Chinese 
Canadians thus came to rest on the willingness of Chinese Canadians to vote in settler colonial 
elections and the seriousness of Chinese and Asian labour exploitation and historical injustice 
was reduced to an electoral promise. 
 This was not the first time the Chinese in Canada faced intense racialization under settler 
colonialism. Chinese Canadians were not idle in protesting against the anti-Chinese laws, 
rumours, and attitudes that contoured their exclusion as subject/citizens. In the face of settler 
colonial rule, Chinese Canadians created self-determining opportunities that allowed them to 
survive the Canadian settler colonial governance. Here are a few examples: in 1907, they 
mobilized in protesting school segregationx; with the 1923 amendment to ban all Chinese from 
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Canada, July 1st, Dominion Day, was renamed “Annual Humiliation Day” and many Chinese 
refused to participate in any celebrations; veterans of the First World War fighting on the 
Canadian side demanded citizenship rights upon their return and they won; and with the 
repealing of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, Chinese men and women of different 
generations across Canada lobbied against the federal government for immediate aid in family 
reunification. It is meaningful to note here, then, that while the spectacle of national apology 
focused on the ways in which the federal government expressed sorrow for the exclusion of early 
Chinese immigrants in Canadian history, it is compelling to see that the roots of resilience are 
always present. 
 
Aporia of Apology 
 When considering these “grand acts of apology” in a general sense, an understanding of 
what forgiveness does, and more importantly, what forgiveness fails to do, is crucial, especially 
as one takes into consideration how current modes of systemic violence continue to 
disproportionately and negatively impact Indigenous and racialized communities. Indeed, these 
gestures of apology have proven to be an effective and useful political tactic (because they 
continue to be made) for settler colonial governments to legitimate and thus absolve themselves 
from historical and moral wrongdoing. Suspiciously, since the 2006 apology to Chinese 
Canadians, subsequent apologies made by subsequent governments have replicated the use of the 
term ‘dark chapter’ to reference specific histories of violence. While it is true that Canada has 
many dark chapters to account for in its fraught historical emergence, the recycling of cliché 
phraseology for multiple apologies signals a lack of sincerity and therefore a lack of ethical 
reflexivity. This becomes a fundamental ethical failure of settler colonial political parties that 
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cannot (or refuse to) distinguish between each historical event of injustice, thus highlighting the 
need to investigate the overall suspicious purpose, function, and authenticity of state-sponsored 
apologies. From a philosophical point of view, Derrida captures the suspicious nature of grand 
performances of apology in On Cosmopolitanism and On Forgiveness:  
In all scenes of repentance, confession, forgiveness, or apology which 
have multiplied on the geopolitical scene since the last war, and in an 
accelerated fashion in the past few years, one sees not only 
individuals, but also entire communities, professional corporations, 
and representatives of the ecclesiastical hierarchies, sovereigns, and 
heads of state ask for ‘forgiveness’…. This sort of transformation 
structured the theatrical space in which the grand forgiveness, the 
grand scene of repentance which we are concerned with, is played, 
sincerely or not.xi 
 
The expression of sorrow, the ceremony of speeches, shaking of hands, an official declaration of 
apology, transfer of monies given to compensate for ‘lost time’—this is the spectacle of settler 
colonial apologies, which function to revitalize notions of good government with public gestures 
of repentance that are meant to capture and represent the grief of the entire nation. The potential 
for reconciliation is made all the more convoluted when the performative elements of apology 
are privileged as spectacle over and against genuine requests for forgiveness. On this basis, the 
sincerity of the apology is not what is crucial, but a convincing performance. Given that such 
grand acts of apology are made in an effort to promote the urgency of the past (of memory, as 
Derrida notes), the language of apology (which reuses poorly recycled phraseology) that shapes 
the request for forgiveness determines the finality of the situation and of the return to a state of 
normalcy. The very tension of authenticity here lies in the fact that “forgiveness is not, it should 
not be, normal, normative, normalizing.”xii  
“What kind of forgiveness wouldn’t be sincere?”, one may ask. It is indeed true that we 
exchange acts of apology and forgiveness every day; yet, we must acknowledge that the 
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variances of forgiveness and apology are amplified in the contexts of historical and/or 
longstanding legacies of colonialism and imperialism that we witness today. Forgiveness 
constituted by an average everyday sense of being cannot account for the weight of a forgiveness 
shaped by a settler colonial nation states’ responsibility for numerous historical injustices. 
Rather, forgiveness as an act of ethical responsibility requires the perpetrator to do the 
impossible. For instance, reconciliation via decolonization, respecting treaty laws, and stopping 
the policing of Indigenous and Black and Brown bodies are the immediate and grim 
impossibilities confronting the Canadian state, even if it refuses to acknowledge this urgency. If 
“forgiveness must announce itself s impossibility itself,” Derrida notes, then the theoretical and 
practical conundrum of asking for forgiveness rests on how “it can only be possible in doing the 
impossible.”xiii The aporia of settler colonial apologies, therefore, relies on the understanding 
that the implications for forgiveness rely on action, including vocalizing apology as 
transformative and transformational—what Derrida considers a “visions of forgiveness, pure 
forgiveness,”xiv—and community-engaged action. Community-engaged action is “the reality of a 
society at work in pragmatic processes of reconciliation”xv and can potentially function to 
address the uniqueness of each community and, more directly, each member granting 
forgiveness. 
 This idea that each community member could grant forgiveness to that one’s perpetrator 
is a display of the radical notion that ethics is first philosophy. Levinas, a supporter of this ethics, 
contends that the ethical relation with the Other emerges by and through an invitation that 
welcomes the Other. A relation to alterity is the recognition of the Other’s existence, wherein a 
dweller of a home “[comes] to him across the world of possessed things” and “at the same time 
to establish, by gift, community and universality.”xvi The unfolding of this community and 
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universality is dependent upon an ethical relation with the Other. Thus, any politics founded on 
the abuse of forgiveness is one based on the calculability of human life, as Derrida notes, 
“because it always has to do with negotiations more or less acknowledged, with calculated 
transactions, with conditions…”xvii, thereby truncating the attainability of an ethical relation from 
a Leviniasian standpoint. The continued enactment of violence and calculation against the Other 
prevents the formation of this ethicality. The difficulty of being forgiven for the unforgiveable 
grounds the notion that apology must speak to the specificity and independence of each 
community member granting forgiveness, and to hold a relationship to standards of calculation 
and transaction negates what Levinas conceptualizes as the authentic face-to-face encounter.  
Levinas’ radical position on ethics calls for a face-to-face relation (between guilty and 
victim, Self and Other) in order to fulfill the notion of ‘ethics as first philosophy’ and to make 
manifest sincere exchanges of dialogue and of apology and forgiveness. The resoluteness of 
Levinas’ position on ethics lies in the real-life impossibility of enacting such a relation. In terms 
of pragmatics, even if a head of state offered sincere and unconditional apology to victims on 
behalf of the guilty, Derrida contends that if anyone has the right to forgive, it is only the victim. 
There can be no substitute. Fulfilling this ethical relation calls for “the immense and painful 
experience of the survivor: who would have the right to forgive in the name of the disappeared 
victims?”xviii In both these instances, Derrida and Levinas call upon us to reflect on what is 
essential to transcend average everyday forms of forgiveness and to ascend to a level of radical 
ethicality that transforms the guilty. These multilayered negotiations within the ethical relation 
resist the return to normative conceptions of governance, of which Derrida is rightly suspicious. 
The introduction of an ethical relation could also confront and potentially undermine what Tuck 
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and Yang call “settler colonial moves to innocence” (such as settler nativism, colonial 
equivocation, and conscientizationxix). 
 How one conceives of the aporia of settler colonial apologies does not solely lie in 
determining whether or not apologies should be given based on their sincerity. Sincerity, if it is 
unconditional, exists when the state is able to actualize its apologies by changing how it relates 
to the poor, the racialized, women, and policed bodies. Yet, each time apology seeks to mimic by 
replicating former apologies in language and intent, the apology itself becomes less about 
requesting forgiveness from the community and more about eliciting a manufactured response 
and feeling from a national audience, which falsely substantiate settler intimations of innocence 
and claims of multicultural benevolence. Tuck and Yang have referred to this state of affairs as 
the problematic attempt to “reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity.”xx 
In re-stabilizing heteronormative paradigms of civility and benevolence, spectacles of settler 
colonial theatrics are “aimed at producing a reconciliation (national or international) favourable 
to a normalization.”xxi The reinstatement of this hegemonic normalcy, thanks to the settler 
colonial tactic of apology, is thus strengthened by subsuming past injustices under the powerful 
paradigm of the “model minority”.  
The restoration of normative and familiar values stands in deep juxtaposition to the 
unconditional forgiveness for which Derrida calls. Unconditional forgiveness is a form of 
forgiveness without power between the guilty and the victim. Yet, the possibility for an 
unconditional forgiveness is foreclosed, again, because of the false finality of apology and its 
reducibility to a performative spectacle. When apology is used as a political tactic to restore 
normative values of settler colonial hegemony, even if forgiveness is granted by the victims, its 
ethicality (its purity) is compromised. The implication of “never again” behind apology, even 
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though evidently vocalized, is difficult to actualize because it is ultimately anchored in an 
admission (which the state is not ready to make) that the same injustices of our past continue to 
occur today, though they may look very different from previous instantiations. Instead, the 
function of the spectacle operates to centralize a performance of conviviality and responsibility, 
while avoiding the overall structural predicament of racialization. An ethical position would be 
to see that “sometimes forgiveness…must be a gracious gift, without exchange, and without 
conditions; sometimes it requires, as its minimal condition, the repentance and transformation of 
the sinner.”xxii Given the state’s refusal or unwillingness to fulfill such ethicality (at both the 
levels of individual and nation-to-nation), it becomes clear why countries founded on the state of 
exception, such as Canada, have had to rely on apologies (among other settler colonial tactics) as 
crisis tendencies in order that normative settler colonial social orders may continue to persist. 
Simply saying “Sorry” is not enough. 
 As undertakings of assimilation and erasure continue to be worked into the fabric of 
settler colonial social orders of belonging, forgiveness, as I continue to argue, is often used as a 
conditional and calculated transaction that reaffirms the tranquility of settler moves to innocence 
and the rhetoric of benevolence and hospitality. When the victim is deprived of speech or voice, 
whether it be in the moment that the crime is committed or in testimonial, forgiving the 
unforgiveable is redirected as an average everyday sentiment and the weight of ascending to a 
radical transformation is made less urgent. Derrida posits that “when the victim and the guilty 
share no language, when nothing common and universal permits them to understand one another, 
forgiveness seems deprived of meaning.”xxiii  
It is important to note there that Derrida is not speaking literally here about two people 
speaking in a common language (indeed, Levinas has contended, especially in Totality and 
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Infinity, that the ethical relation transcends literal language). Rather, the shared language of 
ethics is what remains absent in these exchanges. When the bureaucratic work to control dictates 
the finality of forgiveness, it is not pure. When the performative work to control language 
recycles phraseology of darkness in a distant past or is used to represent apology on behalf of all 
Canadians—even those who do not want to apologize—it is not pure. Instead, the discussion of 
Asian labour and bodily exploitation, the stalling of what could have been the earlier 
development of second and third generations, the government’s slow response to 
enfranchisement and family reunification—these concerns of familial and social well-being are 
obscured or rendered historical in nation-making narratives. Hence, it appears that genuine 
requests for forgiveness and the conditional elements of state participation are polarized, and 
many who identify as Chinese Canadian may find themselves oscillating between these two 
seemingly irreconcilable polarities. 
 
Learning to be Good Guests 
 In discussing the elements of apology, forgiveness, and responsibility that constitute 
settler colonial crisis management, I have found that Coast Salish author Lee Maracle’s 
conception of host laws and Levinas’ notion of ethical relation render a unique reading of the 
settler/native/arrivant paradigm in Canada. First, Maracle affirms an ethical engagement with 
which Indigenous people, as hosts, continue to share, despite colonialism. “Our laws say, quite 
simply: everybody eats. Secondly, every woman is entitled to a house. Everybody eats and every 
woman is entitled to a house… The third one is that everyone has access to unlimited wealth of 
the land.”xxiv To be clear, these modes of maintaining an ethical relation with others and the land 
are not only place-based; they also have a history far deeper than the traditions of European 
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settler statehood, which are only as old as 1867. Maracle’s explanation of these host laws—laws 
that have been in place for thousands of years—contain similar degrees of ethicality as Levinas’ 
call to face the Other. The failure of white settlers to consider the hospitality of Indigenous 
peoples means that both host and guests are disadvantaged, albeit suffering disproportionately. 
The settler’s struggle to remain free is a struggle “to hold the place of privileged, of white, 
Anglo-Saxon men against the backdrop of Indigenous resistance.” As Maracle further contends, 
“when we oppose that, in order for it to be a political struggle, we have to have a counter law, 
and you have a counter law, and it’s my law. It’s the first law of Indigenous people.”xxv  
Maracle takes to task Eurocentric notions of individuality and belonging by delineating a 
critical point for good relations: “there’s no such thing as an immigrant. You’re either a visitor or 
a citizen. If you’re just visiting, be a good guest.”xxvi As the autochthonous hosts of the land, 
then, Indigenous peoples continue to be unjustly framed through alienation on their homelands, 
despite having practiced concrete ethical actions of care and welcoming far longer than the 
traditions of European colonialism. The limits of this relation under a settler colonial schema, for 
now, continue to be determined by the state on absolute conditions that disregard Indigenous 
laws in favour of a rudimentary and dichotomous assimilation or elimination model. The recent 
performances of national apologies are practices of hegemony that attempt to ensure selected 
non-white and non-Indigenous racialized beings are condemned to settler colonial laws. 
Maracle’s mention that we are guests is a critical reminder that arrivants (ranging from settlers of 
colour to indentured labourers) are guests with specific responsibilities, and this can be read 
alongside Levinas’ notion of ethical hospitality or hospitality as ethics. 
 Levinas writes: “In order that I be able to free myself from the very possession that the 
welcome of the home establishes… I must know how to give what I possess.”xxvii While Levinas 
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is suggesting here that the home welcomes the Other as an individual through the concrete 
actions of giving food, shelter, and comfort, Maracle explains the concept of host laws on the 
basis of nation-to-nation relation. Both understand that an ethical relation emerges on this basis 
of sharing as individuals within the same community.  
To understand Levinas’ schema of dweller, Other, and Third in more clearly, consider the 
introduction of the Chinese arrivant into the settler/native relation. The arrivant is analogous to 
the arrival of the Levinasian Third, which David Gauthier describes as the coming of the “Other 
to the Other”.xxviii Corresponding to the position of the arrivant in the settler colonial triad, the 
introduction of the Third into the home is the presenting of a new communicative situation, 
wherein language must expand its boundaries beyond the settler/native dialectic to include “the 
entire human collective”. Language in this sense, again, is not the literal commonality of shared 
language, but the language of humanity (of humanism) which grounds ethical action. The 
exchange of language must adapt to incorporate the larger human community in order to shake 
off the tranquility of normalcy and to form a new communicative situation. Arriving at a time 
when their own homelands were deprived by European imperialism, Chinese arrivants were 
socially and politically held to similar degrading standards as most Indigenous communities by 
the settler state. To be certain, I am not contending that Chinese and Indigenous peoples come 
from identical histories of trauma (that would be unfair and reductive). Rather, Indigenous and 
critical race scholars have noted the unique position of the arrivant as a vital placeholder in the 
triad who has unique responsibilities to Indigenous peoples and decolonization. In all Levinasian 
accounts, then, the dweller welcomes the Other and the Third into the home; the relationships are 
constituted differently and can be renegotiated for new communicative relations and such ethical 
hospitality can account for the welcoming of multiple Others and Thirds. The relationship 
  
 
107 
between dweller, Other, and Third from the position of ‘ethics as first philosophy’ is supposed to 
be one of mutual belonging and mutual responsibility. If this relation were to manifest 
meaningfully in Canada, it would mean a transformation of settler colonial modes of governance 
that eliminates the metaphysical divisiveness that prevents mutual communication and 
responsibility.  
 Reviewing the ethics behind the 2006 apology to Chinese Canadians for the head tax and 
Chinese Immigration Act is a sobering reminder that there are always traces of historical violence 
and injustice attached to actions and attitudes towards the poor and oppressed today. If, when, 
and until we transcend facile performances of apology that function to uphold the thin veneer of 
settler colonial conviviality, genuine requests for forgiveness and the formation of ethical 
relations remain concealed and the challenges against settler colonial hegemony continue. Social, 
economic, and political control over Asian migrants in the past is a part of a larger body of crisis 
management that began with wanting cheap Chinese labour, but not Chinese subjects or citizens, 
to forge the nation’s transcontinental economy. It is meaningful here to examine the end of the 
Chinese exclusion in Canada. In 1947, in a scramble to save international face and appeal to the 
United Nations statement on human rights, Canada transformed the way it socially and 
politically engaged with Chinese people when it completely repealed the Chinese Immigration 
Act and put an end to nearly 25 years of Chinese exclusion and family separation. Importantly, 
Peter Li has written that with China’s victory over Japan at the end of the Second World War, 
Canada’s racist anti-Chinese policies became an embarrassment for the state. Not only did the 
Exclusion Act come to contradict the emerging human rights discourse brought forth by the 
U.N.,xxix it was woefully embarrassing for an emerging democratic country such as Canada to 
maintain racist exclusionary laws against people of an allied nation. It was a bitter-sweet victory 
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for Chinese Canadians, especially for those who had not seen their families before 1923. 
Arguably, these transformations towards being a more convivial and hospitable democratic 
nation arise out of a short genealogy of political scrambles and crisis management that evidently 
demonstrate the unsustainability of settler colonialism. While many Chinese Canadians were and 
are right to be satisfied with Harper’s apology, I cannot help but feel resistant to the idea of 
reconciliation that posits Chinese Canadians as having finally “made it”. 
It was not so long ago, after all, that white Canadian society turned its back on early 
Chinese labourers and railway workers, who then relied deeply on the gracious hospitality of 
Indigenous peoples, some of whom welcomed only the Chinese as their guests. We now have an 
opportunity to return that ethical favour to the descendants of the Indigenous ancestors who 
helped our Chinese ancestors survive. This is done by forming political, social, and economic 
strategy and action against the same sorry state that denied our belonging and the belonging of 
others. The rejection of Chinese belonging brought us to the gracious welcoming of Indigenous 
hosts, and it is time to return the ethical favour and uphold our responsibilities to decolonization 
and Indigenous peoples by learning to be good guests. 
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